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Abstract: The Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 (RRA93) signifi-
cantly expanded the earned income credit (EIC), which was changed 
to include low-income taxpayers without dependents. Evolving, most 
directly, from the "workfare" plan (1972) proposed by Senate Finance 
Committee Chairman, Russel B. Long, and in response to President 
Nixon's Family Assistance Program (FAP), the post-1974 EIC was not 
the first of its kind. It had two predecessors. 
The EIC of 1923 through 1931 benefitted taxpayers with or with-
out dependents and excluded any "workfare" feature. A second EIC, 
in name only, was in effect for the 1934 through 1943 tax years. 
This paper develops a historical framework for study of the post-
1974 EIC. This framework necessarily precedes any investigation of 
contemporary issues relating to the twenty-year history of the post-
1974 EIC which, unlike its first predecessor, appears destined to con-
tinue as a permanent, expanding mechanism for the delivery of basic 
subsistence to the "working poor." The resolution of these contempo-
rary issues will determine whether the post-1974 EIC is destined to 
replace or continue to co-exist with a (presumably) more costly wel-
fare delivery system. 
INTRODUCTION 
Initially designed to partially offset the adverse and rapidly 
growing impact of increasing Social Security taxes on the work-
ing poor, the EIC has undergone several expansionary stages 
since first introduced (in its current form) for the 1975 tax year.1 
The Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 (RRA93) eliminated the 
separate health insurance and newborn child components of the 
earned income credit (EIC) and provided for a revised, basic 
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sample data used for portions of this paper. Also, two anonymous reviewers for 
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1Table 3 summarizes EIC phase-in, flat, and phase-out ranges from 1975 
through 1996. Exhibits 1, 2, and 3 provide graphical representations of the same. 
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EIC to include low-income taxpayers without dependents. This, 
ever-evolving, post-1974 EIC is not the first of its kind. 
The first EIC was available for the 1923 through 1931 tax 
years. Unlike the post-1974 EIC, the first EIC was never depen-
dency exemption-based, did not provide for a "refundable" 
credit, and did not, in its final form, seek to maintain any form 
of "workfare" or work incentive feature. 
A new, revised EIC became available for the 1934 through 
1943 tax years. This second EIC was a "credit" in name only. It 
was what today might be referred to as a "deduction" and even-
tually evolved into the current "standard deduction," available to 
non-itemizer taxpayers.2 
This paper describes and distinguishes between the first 
(1923 through 1931), second (1934 through 1943), and current 
(post-1974) EICs. It summarizes events leading to the post-1974 
EIC and provides a basic structural framework for analysis of 
the post-1974 EIC period. It reviews many of the concerns 
raised by contemporary policy-makers and researchers that re-
main unresolved (or are exacerbated) after RRA93. 
The lack of widespread knowledge and acceptance of EIC 
advanced payment options and the failure of the RRA93 expan-
sion of the EIC to provide for any form of wealth-based means 
test represent problems unlike those previously encountered by 
our tax collection system. However, the incompatibility of the 
"workfare" provisions of the contemporary EIC with existing 
welfare systems suggests that certain historical lessons have 
gone unnoticed by contemporary policy-makers. 
THE FORM OF THE EIC 
The post-1974 EIC contains a "work incentive" feature, in-
creasing its political palatability and distinguishing it from a 
"negative income tax" or some other form of a "guaranteed 
minimum income." Ammer and Ammer (1977, p. 284) define a 
"negative income tax" as 
(a) form of welfare payment whereby all low-income 
individuals and families receive a direct cash subsidy 
from the government that is sufficient to raise them to 
2
 A tax "credit" results in a dollar for dollar reduction in the taxpayer's tax 
liability. A tax "deduction" is multiplied by a taxpayer-specific marginal tax rate 
to determine the taxpayer's tax liability reduction. A tax credit, therefore, is 
more valuable (to any taxpayer) than a tax deduction for an equal amount. 
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subsistence level. The subsidy itself is the negative tax. 
Supporters . . . argue that it could replace all other wel-
fare programs, along with the bureaucracy and alleged 
waste they engender. Critics, however, believe it would 
remove incentives to work . . . A version of this idea was 
put into practice in 1975, when all U.S. social security 
recipients received a supplementary check for $50, re-
gardless of their income. 
A negative income tax is a welfare program, providing a 
basic grant to individuals with no income. (The Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children - Foster Care (AFDC-FC) program is 
an example of a welfare program). As Exhibit 1 illustrates, the 
negative income tax is phased-out as income increases, until it 
eventually reaches zero and the individual begins to pay tax. The 
general form of the post-1974 EIC is also illustrated by Exhibit I. 
Note that the EIC provides for a variation of a negative income 
tax, but differs from the true form in two respects: (1) the EIC 
increases as the taxpayer's earned income (EI) increases and (2) 
a taxpayer with no EI receives no credit. 
A true negative income tax would typically provide for a 
larger (smaller) subsidy as income decreases (increases). There-
fore, the EI requirements of the post-1974 EIC, unlike other 
welfare programs, maintains a politically popular "workfare" el-
ement. 
The new EI credit addresses ability-to-pay issues by reduc-
ing the impact of rising, regressive Social Security taxes on the 
working poor. This objective is achieved while simultaneously 
maintaining Social Security contributions characterized by pro-
gressive benefit structures (and based on the family unit). 
The low-income taxpayers intended to benefit from the 
post-1974 EIC are typically not subject to progressive income 
tax rates. Therefore, EIC provisions are consistent with a family 
assistance philosophy while leaving intact the existing Social 
Security tax (and benefit) system. 
Beginning on July 1, 1979, eligible taxpayers anticipating an 
EIC-based refund had the option of receiving an advanced EIC 
payment (AEIC), reported as a reduction of the EIC on the 
taxpayer's federal income tax return, and limited to the amount 
available for one qualifying child. In this respect, the EIC pos-
sesses a cash or near-cash feature and behaves like a negative 
income tax or welfare benefit to low-income taxpayers. 
The successful public acceptance of this alternative to wel-
fare programs such as AFDC-FC, etc., must necessarily precede 
3
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the elimination of alternative, presumably more costly,3 basic 
subsistence delivery systems. However, as Yin and Forman 
[1993, p. 951] point out,". . . almost none of the recipients ob-
tains the benefit incrementally during the course of the year" 
and Holt [1994, p. 759] indicates that " . . . fewer than 1 in 200 
EIC recipients takes advantage . . . " of the AEIC. 
THE POST-1993 EIC REINFORCES CERTAIN 
OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS 
RRA93 provides for the beneficial inclusion of low-income 
taxpayers without dependents for post-1993 tax years. Prior to 
RRA93, there was some disagreement with respect to the appro-
priate operational definition of the marriage tax penalty (MTP). 
Should the MTP include or exclude its largest component, the 
EIC [Rosen, 1987 and 1988, and McIntyre, 1988]? 
The EIC-based component of MTPs for the 1974 through 
1993 tax years might have been eliminated from consideration 
as true MTPs, under the assumption that such amounts were 
attributable to the decision to have children, as distinguished 
from the decision to marry. Though this point was not ad-
dressed in the literature,4 the post-1993 EIC, with its beneficial 
inclusion of low-income taxpayers without dependents, elimi-
nates the potential for such distinctions for post-1993 tax years. 
Researchers interested in the historical relevance and magnitude 
of post-1974 EIC-driven MTPs may find it useful to note this 
distinction between pre-1994 and post-1993 periods to the ex-
tent that it presents the need for research design modification. 
Though the post-1993 EIC will undoubtedly result in greater 
MTPs [Lipman and Williamson, 1994, and Polinsky, 1993], it 
has evolved from a qualified dependency exemption-based pov-
erty reduction measure, to one more inclusive of the general 
population. Though still "workfare"-dependent, the inclusion of 
3
 For example, the popular press has recently drawn attention to discussions 
of a return to the use of orphanages to replace AFDC-FC group homes, etc. The 
administrative costs of such programs include overpayments to providers, which 
frequently go uncollected, since the over-riding concern of such agencies is the 
shortage of placement facilities (see, for example, Report by the Auditor General 
of California, 1986). 
Costs of the post-RRA93 EIC are projected to approximate about $25 billion 
in fiscal year 1998, roughly 150 percent of the federal share of the AFDC-FC 
program [Yin and Forman, 1993, p. 951]. 
4
 This may be the result of early emphasis on supplementing and/or eventu-
ally replacing the AFDC-FC programs with the EIC. See Hoffman and Seidman 
[1990] and Campbell and Peirce [1980]. 
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low-income taxpayers without dependents as potential benefi-
ciaries links the EIC more closely with general welfare programs 
and reduces its similarity to the dependent-based AFDC-FC pro-
gram. 
HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK 
Three EICs have emerged over discontinuous periods and in 
very different forms: the first EIC existed for a nine year period 
(1923 through 1931) and the post-World War I benefits were 
primarily short-term, economic stimulus-motivated, and avail-
able to all taxpayers; the second EIC lasted for a ten year period 
(1934 through 1943) over which this "credit" evolved to take the 
form of our current "standard deduction;" and the post-1974 
EIC has evolved and expanded during this twenty-one years and 
continues changing with the passage of RRA93 (1974 through 
1994). 
THE FIRST EIC (1923 THROUGH 1931) 
The Revenue Act of 1921, enacted November 23, 1921, and 
amended March 4, 1923 (see Revenue Act of 1924, H.R. 6715, 
Public Law No. 176, p. 264), sought to stimulate an economy 
recovering from World War I. Beginning with the 1923 (and 
extending through the 1931) tax year(s), a nonrefundable EIC 
was established and maintained. As described by Pechman 
[1987, pp. 109], 
. . . the earned income allowance was granted in the 
form of a deduction that ranged from 10 to 25 percent 
of earned net income. In some years the deduction was 
allowed for normal tax purposes only; in others it was 
allowed for both normal tax and surtax. In all years a 
certain minimum amount of income ($3,000 or $5,000) 
was presumed to be earned whether it actually was or 
not, and the deduction was limited to a maximum rang-
ing from $10,000 to $30,000. The tax value of the de-
duction was . . . never worth more than $495 for a fam-
ily of two (in 1928-31). . . 
This first, nonrefundable EIC was originally formulated un-
der the proposition that a distinction should be made favoring 
(disfavoring) earned (unearned) income. The preference of a 
system taxing lightly income earned relative to that resulting 
from investments was supported under the "ability to pay" 
principle, but was not without difficulty in administration. The 
discussion of this inequity and the administrative difficulties 
6
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were addressed (see the Revenue Act of 1924, H.R. 6715, Public 
Law No. 176, p. 264): 
The taxpayer who receives salaries, wages, and other 
earned income must each year save and set aside a por-
tion of his income in order to protect him in case of 
sickness and in his old age, and in order to provide for 
his family upon his death. On the other hand, the per-
son whose income is derived from investments already 
has his capital and is relieved of the necessity of saving 
to establish it. 
The difficulty comes when an attempt is made to divide 
that income which is in part earned and in part un-
earned into the two classes. Such a segregation would 
involve either (1) treating as unearned that part of the 
taxpayer's income which represents a reasonable return 
upon the capital invested and considering the remain-
der as earned or (2) treating as earned income an 
amount representing a reasonable allowance as, in con-
nection with the administration of the excess-profits 
tax, salary for the personal services actually rendered by 
the taxpayer. 
Initial proposals (see Ways and Means Committee, 68th 
Congress, 1st Session, House Report 179, p. 78) of a 25 percent 
tax reduction for taxpayers whose incomes were earned would 
have benefitted salaried and professional people, but would have 
excluded farmers (currently, Schedule F income) and self-em-
ployed or small business persons (currently, Schedule C and 
certain K-l pass-throughs for closely held S corporation in-
come). 
Because of the administrative difficulties in arriving at an 
equitable solution to the segregation of earned and unearned 
components of certain classes of income, the "earned" income 
credit became a misnomer. This first EIC was extended to all 
individuals subject to the normal tax. 
Furthermore, it imposed no requirements with respect to 
the existence of a dependent or qualifying dependency exemp-
tion. In fact, upon review of the early part of this period, this 
first EIC would appear to have gone so far as to favor (disfavor) 
single (married) taxpayers by providing for minimum and maxi-
mum EICs of $20 ($12.50) and $75 ($555), respectively. 
5
 This credit could increase to as much as $90 when the entire personal 
exemption amount was taken by one spouse (i.e., married, filing separately) and 
in the event that no dependency exemptions were available [KixMiller & Baar, 
1924, pp. 19-20]. 
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It is important to note, however, that these provisions were 
designed prior to/in the absence of our post-1970 (and current) 
system of separate tax rate schedules for married and single 
taxpayers [Brozovsky and Cataldo, 1994, pp. 179-180]. During 
this period, two-earner, married taxpayers were effectively per-
mitted the option of using the same progressive tax rate table 
twice. Therefore, the "rate" component of the marriage tax bo-
nus (MTB) associated with the pre-1971 period tax rate sched-
ules might, today, be perceived as more than adequately com-
pensatory for the failure to extend additional preferential 
treatment to married taxpayers in the form of a larger EIC. 
TABLE 1 
The First EARNED INCOME CREDIT 
(1923 through 1931) 
Tax 
Year 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
Total Returns 
Total 
Returns 
7,698,321 
7,369,788 
4,171,051 
4,138,092 
4,101,547 
4,070,851 
4,044,327 
3,707,509 
3,225,924 
1923-31 Averages 
Average 
Wage 
$1,844 
$1,848 
$2,336 
$2,415 
$2,491 
$2,668 
$2,769 
$2,676 
$2,581 
Average 
EIC 
$28.65 
$ 4.16 
$ 5.89 
$ 5.96 
$ 6.07 
$ 8.55 
$ 5.46 
$ 6.71 
$ 5.42 
$ 6.03 
Taxable Returns 
Taxable 
Returns 
4,270,121 
4,489,698 
2,501,166 
2,470,990 
2,440,941 
2,523,063 
2,458,049 
2,037,645 
1,525,546 
Average 
EIC 
$51.65 
$ 6.82 
$ 9.82 
$ 9.97 
$10.21 
$13.79 
$ 8.98 
$12.21 
$11.47 
$10.41 
Average 
Tax Rate 
2.67% 
2.74% 
3.35% 
3.33% 
3.68% 
4.62% 
4.04% 
2.63% 
1.81% 
3.275% 
A summary of the average EIC for total and taxable returns 
for the 1923 through 1931 tax years (Internal Revenue Code 
Section (IRC §) 1200(a) of the Revenue Act of 1924) is provided 
in Table 1 [SOI, 1931, pp. 37-43]. Though retained for the 1924 
through 1931 tax years/ the short-term, post-World War I stimu-
lus nature of this first EIC is apparent when comparing the 1923 
average EIC of $52 per taxable return to the significantly lower 
average EICs for the post-1923 tax years. 
THE SECOND EIC (1934 THROUGH 1943) 
A new, revised EIC was made available for the 1934 through 
1943 tax years. This EIC bore little resemblance to its predeces-
8
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sor. This "credit" resulted in a reduction of taxable amounts 
subject to the normal tax (as opposed to the surtax). Brozovsky 
& Cataldo [1994, pp. 173-174] state that 
(u)nlike the preceding EIC, this "credit" on earned in-
come was comparable to what is today referred to as a 
"deduction". This "credit" on earned income was re-
stricted in amount to 10% of the first $14,000 of "net 
income" for a maximum deduction of $1,400 for single 
or married taxpayers. 
This EIC evolved into a variable standard deduction (1944 
th rough 1963), a semi-variable s tandard deduct ion (1964 
through 1976), and currently takes the form of an inflation-
indexed, fixed standard deduction (1977 through present), sub-
ject to phase-out and eventual elimination for the post-1990 tax 
years [Brozovsky & Cataldo, 1994, pp. 168-169]. 
Events Immediately Preceding the Post-1974 EIC 
What later came to be known as the New Frontier, the War 
on Poverty, and the Great Society, represented the culmination 
of considerable discussion regarding the possibility of a negative 
income tax or a guaranteed minimum income or (basic subsis-
tence) allowance as a means of perfecting or complet ing 
Roosevelt's New Deal. As described by Hildebrand [1967, pp. 1-
2], 
(w)ithin the first six months of 1966 alone, three impor-
tant official documents . . . appeared, all of which com-
mend the goal of universal guaranteed minimum in-
come . . . 
War on Poverty (1964) efforts originated and extended 
through the Kennedy (1961-1963), Johnson (1963-1969), and 
Nixon (1969-1975) administrat ions. These efforts coincided 
with/were overshadowed by the assassinations of President John 
F. Kennedy (1963), Robert F. Kennedy (1968), and Martin 
Luther King (1968), passage of the Civil Rights Act (1964), the 
"Americanization" (1965) of the Vietnam War (1957-1975) 
[Zarefsky, 1986], and Nixon's Family Assistance Program (FAP) 
[Burke and Burke, 1974]. 
Aaron (1978), in his forward, 
. . . argues that the Great society did not fall of its own 
weight, but rather was eclipsed by external events — 
the war in Vietnam, the dissolution of the civil rights 
9
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coalition, and the political defalcations of the Nixon 
Administration. 
The initial, post-1974 EIC closely resembled the $400 credit 
or "workfare" plan (1972) proposed by, then, Chairman of the 
Senate Finance Committee, Russel B. Long (Democrat - Louisi-
ana). Senator Long's father, Senator Huey Long (Democrat -
Louisiana), had been a proponent of the "Share the Wealth Soci-
ety" (1934) prior to his assassination in September, 1935 [Burke 
and Burke, 1974, p. 151]. 
Russel Long had been an outspoken critic of Nixon's FAP, 
for its failure to provide adequate work incentives. The FAP was 
rejected by the Senate Finance Committee (1972) in favor of 
Chairman Long's "workfare" plan. 
THE POST-1974 EIC (1975 FORWARD) 
The Tax Reduction Act of 1975 provided the foundation 
upon which our current EIC is based. This post-1974 EIC was a 
delayed outgrowth of the extended period of political liberalism 
throughout the 1960s and 1970s. 
The post-1974 EIC differed significantly from the first EIC 
(1923 through 1931). These differences are restated and summa-
rized in Table 2. 
TABLE 2 
A Comparison of the First EIC (1923 through 1931) 
and the Post-1974 EIC 
First EIC 
Never refundable. 
Never restricted or based only 
on "earned" income. 
Always available to single 
taxpayers or taxpayers 
without dependents. 
Introduced at a time when the 
same rate schedules applied to 
single and married taxpayers. 
Post-1974 EIC 
Refundable, and beginning July 1, 1979, 
as a payroll advance (AEIC). 
First available to low-income taxpayers 
without dependents for post-1993 
tax years (RRA93). 
Introduced after separate, post-1970, 
rate schedules were developed for single 
and married taxpayers. 
Always based only on 'earned 
income. 
Pre-dated the Social Security 
system. 
Post-dated the Social Security system. 
10
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The evolution of the contemporary EIC is divided into three 
distinct phases: Phase I - initial implementation (1975 through 
1990), Phase II - expansion into additional, separable compo-
nents for health care costs and newborn children6 (1991 through 
1993), and Phase III - merger of previously developed separable 
EIC-based components and the inclusion of low-income taxpay-
ers without dependents (1994 forward). 
Eligibility for the EIC, as modified throughout Phases I and 
II, included criterion for dependent (1) relationship, (2) resi-
dency, and (3) age limitations. The similarities of these early 
requirements to the dependency-based AFDC-FC welfare pro-
gram has been mentioned previously and is apparent. The Phase 
III period resulted in the elimination of qualified dependency 
exemption requirements. 
Phase I (1975 Through 1990) 
The EIC, in its recent historical form, was first made avail-
able for the 1975 tax year and only to low-income workers who 
maintained a household for dependent children, for whom they 
were able to claim an exemption. Designed to reduce the impact 
of Social Security taxes and encourage the pursuit of employ-
ment by low-income individuals, EI includes wages/salaries (and 
related compensation) and net earnings (losses) from self-em-
ployment (Schedules C, F, and, potentially, Schedule E income). 
This EIC was the first refundable credit. It was treated as a tax 
payment and, therefore, subject to refund. 
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 provided for a continuation of 
the EIC for the 1976 and 1977 tax years, while liberalizing the 
requirements for claimants. The Tax Reduction and Simplifica-
tion Act of 1977 extended the EIC through the 1978 tax year. 
Finally, the Revenue Act of 1978 increased the amount of the 
EIC and made it a permanent component of the tax law. 
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 provided for inflation-index-
ation of phaseout amounts, maximum adjusted gross income 
(AGI) limitations, and the maximum available EIC amount. 
(These amounts are adjusted, annually, according to changes in 
the Consumer Price Index-based measures between August 31 of 
the preceding year and August 31 of the current year). For the 
1987 tax year, the EIC phaseout at the 10% rate began at $6,925 
($9,000 as indexed for post-1987 tax years) of the greater of EI 
or AGI (see Table III). No EIC was available for taxpayers with 
6
 Taken in lieu of the child and dependent care credit (Form 2441). 
11
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AGIs or EI of $15,432 (or greater) for the 1987 tax year ($17,000 
as indexed for post-1987 tax years). 
Indexation from 1987 base amounts resulted in increases of 
EIC phaseout amounts and EIC-based maximum AGIs of ap-
proximately 9%, 4%, 5%, 5%, 5%, and 3% (all rounded) for the 
1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, and 1993 tax years, respectively. 
The relationship of EIC phaseout amounts to EIC-based maxi-
mum AGIs remained relatively stable throughout this post-1987 
through pre-1994 period, with the EIC phaseout amounts ap-
proximating 53% of the EIC-based maximum AGIs. 
EXHBIT 2 
Contemporary EARNED INCOME CREDIT — Phase I 
1975 through 1990 (in nominal dollars) 
Amount of EARNED INCOME CREDIT 
12
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TABLE 3 
Evolution of the Post-1974 
EARNED INCOME CREDIT (EIC) 
(1975 through 1994 and 1995 & 1996 
before Inflation-Adjustment) 
Phase III: Supplemental Components Combined with the Basic Credit 
& Inclusion of Low-Income Taxpayers Without Dependents 
1994 
1995 
1996 
0 
1 
2 
0 
1 
2 
0 
1 
2 
7.65% 
26.30% 
30.00% 
7.65% 
34.00% 
36.00% 
7.65% 
34.00% 
40.00% 
7.650% 
15.980% 
17.680% 
7.650% 
15.980% 
20.222% 
7.650% 
15.980% 
21.060% 
$4,000 
$7,750 
$8,425 
$4,168 
$6,252 
$8,779 
$4,343 
$6,515 
$9,148 
$5,000 
$11,000 
" 
$5,210 
$11,462 
" 
$5,429 
$11,943 
$9,000 $306 
$23,753 $2,038 
$25,300 $2,528 
$9,378 $319 
$24,764 $2,126 
$27,090 $3,160 
$9,772 $332 
$25,804 $2,215 
$29,318 $3,659 
B 
B 
B 
B 
B 
B 
Note A: 
Note B: 
$793. Not specified as a separate measure for each EIC component. 
Projected at an annual inflation rate of 4.2% each for 1995 & 1996. 
Tax 
Year(s) 
Qualify Credit 
Dpndnts Rate 
Phase-
Out 
Rate 
"Flat" 
Begin 
Range 
End 
Phase I: Initial Implementation of the Post-1974 EIC 
1975-78 
1979-84 
1985-86 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
> 0 10.00% 
> 0 10.00% 
> 0 11.00% 
> 0 14.00% 
> 0 14.00% 
> 0 14.00% 
> 0 14.00% 
10.000% 
12.500% 
12.222% 
10.000% 
10.000% 
10.000% 
10.000% 
$4,000 
$5,000 
$5,000 
$6,080 
$6,240 
$6,500 
$6,810 
$ 4,000 
$ 6,000 
$ 6,500 
$ 6,920 
$ 9,840 
$10,240 
$10,734 
Max 
EI or 
AGI 
$ 8,000 
$10,000 
$11,000 
$15,432 
$18,576 
$19,340 
$20,264 
Max 
EIC 
$400 
$500 
$550 
$851 
$874 
$910 
$953 
Phase II: Supplemental Health Care and Newborn Components Added 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1 16.70% 
2 17.30% 
Health 6.00% 
Newborn 5.00% 
1 17.60% 
2 18.40% 
Health 6.00% 
Newborn 5.00% 
1 18.50% 
2 19.50% 
Health 6.00% 
Newborn 5.00% 
11.930% 
12.360% 
4.285% 
3.570% 
12.570% 
13.140% 
4.285% 
3.570% 
13.210% 
13.930% 
4.285% 
3.570% 
$7,140 
" 
" 
" 
$7,520 
" 
" 
" 
$7,750 
" 
" 
" 
$11,250 
" 
" 
" 
$11,840 
" 
" 
" 
$12,200 
" 
" 
" 
$21,250 $1,192 
" 
" 
" 
$1,235 
$428 
$357 
$22,370 $1,324 
" 
" 
" 
$1,384 
$451 
$376 
$23,050 $1,434 
" 
" 
" 
$1,511 
$465 
$388 
Avg 
Rfnd 
EIC 
$203 
$270 
$317 
$452 
$540 
$560 
$605 
A 
A 
A 
A 
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Exhibit 2 was developed from the information contained in 
Table 3 [SOI, 1977-1993] and provides a graphic representation 
of the contemporary EIC during the 1975 through 1990 (Phase 
I) tax years [SOI, 1977-1992], under the simplifying assumption 
that the taxpayer's EI is equivalent to their AGI. For post-1986 
tax years, the slope of the phase-in (i.e., credit percentage) of the 
EIC increased, and, with the exception of the 1987 tax year, the 
flat range, over which the maximum EIC was available, in-
creased in breadth. 
However, it is generally acknowledged that during this pe-
riod, the "working poor" lost ground with respect to the infla-
tion-indexed value of exemptions. As pointed out by Sommer-
feld, et al., p. 56, 
. . . (I)n the mid-1970s a family of four began to owe an 
income tax only after it earned about 18-20% over (em-
phasis added) the poverty line. By the mid-1980s, the 
same household was required to pay an income tax af-
ter earning an income level significantly below (empha-
sis added) the poverty level. Indexation for inflation and 
increases in the earned income credit, the standard de-
duction, and the personal exemption allowed the work-
ing poor to be exempt from income tax until their in-
come exceeded the poverty level. These changes are 
expected to keep taxpayers in the same position relative 
to the poverty line thereafter by indexing the standard 
deduction and exemption amount. 
Table 3 summarizes key components of the recent historical 
EIC for the entire 19 year, post-1974 period (i.e., 1975 through 
1993) under review. The following formulas, as they relate to the 
data summarized in Table 3, provide the basis for the calcula-
tion of the EIC for all three phases (including the separable/ 
supplemental health care- and newborn-based EICs, not graphi-
cally depicted, but available during the Phase II period of 1991 
through 1993), where the EIC is the lesser of ( la) or ( lb) . 
( la ) Credit Rate X Min { EI, Flat RangeBEGIN } 
( l b ) Maximum EIC -
[ Phase-Out Rate X ( Max { AGI, E I } 
- Flat RangeEND ) ] 
The flat range is that range of EI over which the EIC is 
maximized. The beginning of the flat range represents that EI 
level where the maximum EIC is first achieved. The end of the 
flat range represents the highest possible EI level where the 
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maximum EIC can be generated. Beyond this ceiling, the EIC is 
reduced at the phase-out rate (see Table 3). 
Phase II (1991 Through 1993) 
For the 1991 [SOI, 1993] through 1993 tax years, additional, 
separable EIC components were made available for supplemen-
tal health care/insurance expenses and newborn/young child de-
pendents. Married, surviving spouse, or head of household filing 
status (i.e., at least one qualifying child in the household) re-
mained a requirement for qualification for the (1) basic, (2) 
supplemental health insurance, and (3) supplemental young 
child EICs. A new Form EIC was developed and used during this 
period. However, the schedules, rules, and tables associated 
with these separate EIC components were very difficult for the 
average taxpayer to understand and were eliminated/merged 
back to a single basic EIC form for the post-1993 period (i.e., 
Phase III). 
Throughout the history of the Federal Insurance Contribu-
tions Act-/Self-Employed Contributions Act- (FICA-/SECA-) 
based Social Security and (later) Medicare tax, beginning with 
the 1937/1951 tax years, the amount to which an employee/em-
ployer or self-employed taxpayer was subject had been limited 
by a ceiling or "wage base." This wage base was adjusted 
through intermittent statutory or (currently) automatic infla-
tion-indexed increases, but remained regressive. The EIC contin-
ued to partially or fully offset the regressive effects of Social 
Security and Medicare and promote tax progressivity. 
Separate, higher wage bases were established for FICA and 
SECA Medicare components at 1.45% (each for employer and 
employee) and 2.9% (for self-employed taxpayers), respectively, 
during the 1991 through 1993 tax years. These increased wage 
bases for the medicare components of FICA/SECA coincided 
with the establishment and maintenance of separate supplemen-
tal health care and newborn EIC components. 
Phase III (1994 Forward) 
For post-1993 tax years, congruent with the first EIC (1923 
through 1931), low-income taxpayers without dependents are 
included as potential beneficiaries of the EIC.7 With the post-
7
 The EIC was originally denied to persons without children to avoid benefits 
to (1) students, (2) retired persons (to avoid duplication of the benefits already 
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1993 move toward a broader definition of the "working poor," 
initially established EIC phase-in percentages equal related 
phase-out percentages for low-income taxpayers without depen-
dents, and are equivalent to the rates used for FICA employer 
and employee contributions at 7.65% each (see Table 3). 
EXHIBIT 3 
Contemporary EARNED INCOME CREDIT — 
Phases II & III 
1991 through 1994 and 1995 & 1996 Projected* 
Credit Rates (Phase-In Percentages) & Flat Ranges* 
Earned Income Level 
$13,000 
$12,000 
$11,000 
$10,000 
$9,000 
$8,000 
$7,000 
$6,000 
$5,000 
$4,000 
$3,000 
91-1 91-2 92-1 92-2 93-1 93-2 94-0 94-1 94-2 95-0 95-1 95-2 96-0 
Tax Year — Min. Req'd No. of Qualified Dependents 
*1995 & 1996 Projections at 4.2% Annual Inflation Rates. 
-1 96-2 
provided by the credit for the elderly (Schedule R)), and (3) part-time workers 
with small amounts of EI. 
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Exhibit 3 illustrates the recent historical trend for the credit 
rates and flat ranges associated with post-1990 (i.e., Phases II 
and III) EICs. The generally upward "creeping" (or inflation-
indexed) movement of these flat ranges is apparent throughout 
the period. 
The higher wage bases established for the Medicare compo-
nent (i.e., 1.45% and 2.9% for employer/employee and self-em-
ployed taxpayers, respectively) for the 1991 through 1993 (Phase 
II) period have been completely eliminated for post-1993 tax 
years, creating a "flat" or proportional tax for this (previously 
regressive) component of FICA/SECA. The elimination of this 
ceiling coincides with the establishment of the no dependent 
EIC inclusion for post-1993 tax years (see Exhibit 3). 
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 
The difficulties associated with the distinction between 
earned and unearned income in the establishment of the first 
EIC (1923 through 1931) were considered, addressed, and cir-
cumvented by making the credit available to all taxpayers and 
based on both earned and unearned income. These complica-
tions were not avoided under the more contemporary, post-1974 
EIC, which attempts to create a distinction between earned and 
unearned income. As a result, problems, other than those en-
countered in the early 1920s, have evolved. 
First, in providing for the separate treatment of earned and 
unearned income, the post-1974 EIC has included both wages 
and self-employment income. Such amounts are often subject to 
manipulation, and, as O'Neil and Nelsestuen (1994) have deter-
mined, a significant portion of EIC benefits may be providing 
assistance to middle-class or even very wealthy taxpayers.8 Simi-
lar conclusions were drawn by Cataldo (1994) in his review of 
the projected trends and increased phase-in credit percentages 
associated with the broader, post-1993 EIC-based flat ranges. 
For example, wealthy taxpayers, already involved in tax-
minimizing strategies and in control of closely held corpora-
tions, might legitimately provide/manipulate the cost of their 
own services (i.e., salaries) to EI levels falling within their re-
spective flat ranges, in efforts to maximize potentially refund-
8
 O'Neil and Nelsestuen [1994] proposed implementation of a "cliff-based" 
wealth restriction measure, where the taxpayer's taxable and non-taxable inter-
est income and taxable dividend income might be used, in aggregate form, as a 
proxy for wealth and a means test for EIC benefits elimination. 
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able EICs. Similarly, middle- (and high-) income, self-employed 
taxpayers in the process of start-up or expansion, might manipu-
late income/expense items and even make post-year-end elec-
TABLE4 
Selected Descriptive Statistics from 1989 SOI Returns 
Taxpayers Benefitting from the EIC 
Count (N) for Amounts > $910 EIC 
AGI Class N Int Div's 
AGIs Below One Dollar ($1): 
AGI<$1 
PCT TTLS 
140 
2% 
77 
23% 
38 
36% 
Sch E 
19 
13% 
Sch C/F 
75 
8% 
PALs 
54 
50% 
AMT 
37 
77% 
Mean 
$496 
Std Dev 
$293 
For All Returns (N=140; N=280 for Sch C/F) in AGI<$1 Class 
Min $0 $0 $(7)M $(421)K 
Mean $90K $7K $(369)K $(6)K 
Max $1.9M $334K $507K $102K 
Std Dev $261K $35K $1M $43K 
AGIs Above Zero 
AGI<$1K 
AGI<$2K 
AGI<$3K 
AGI<$4K 
AGI<$5K 
AGI<$6K 
AGI<$7K 
AGI<$8K 
AGI<$9K 
AGI<$10K 
AGI<$11K 
AGI<$12K 
AGI<$13K 
AGI<$14K 
AGI<$15K 
AGI<$16K 
AGI<$17K 
AGI<$18K 
AGI<$19K 
AGI<$20K 
75 
131 
159 
207 
225 
249 
303 
323 
329 
323 
380 
374 
371 
364 
383 
339 
359 
322 
347 
93 
TTLS 5,796 
PCT N 100% 
($0): 
0 
0 
5 
5 
6 
9 
10 
12 
10 
11 
17 
20 
19 
24 
13 
21 
24 
22 
26 
6 
337 
6% 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
4 
2 
3 
3 
4 
8 
4 
5 
7 
4 
3 
4 
7 
8 
2 
107 
2% 
0 
1 
1 
4 
2 
5 
6 
6 
8 
5 
9 
10 
7 
8 
7 
11 
14 
8 
13 
4 
148 
3% 
1 
20 
18 
28 
42 
32 
57 
52 
64 
60 
69 
62 
53 
56 
58 
54 
60 
47 
52 
14 
974 
17% 
0 
2 
2 
2 
1 
0 
3 
6 
2 
1 
4 
5 
3 
2 
3 
6 
6 
2 
2 
1 
107 
2% 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
2 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
48 
1% 
$113 
$227 
$341 
$467 
$604 
$725 
$839 
$860 
$880 
$883 
$852 
$761 
$675 
$565 
$477 
$380 
$274 
$179 
$86 
$18 
$123 
$115 
$88 
$97 
$105 
$130 
$147 
$142 
$122 
$113 
$110 
$97 
$56 
$85 
$55 
$44 
$55 
$35 
$30 
$9 
Notes: At AGI levels > $19,340, the EIC was unavailable (see "Max EI or AGI" 
column of Table 3). 
M = Millions. 
K = Thousands. 
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tions (like the IRC 179 expense election) to maximize refundable 
EICs. 
Table 4 summarizes selected descriptive statistics for all re-
turns qualifying for the EIC for the 1989 tax year. It was devel-
oped from the 1989 SOI Public Use File [SOI, 1992]. The maxi-
m u m available EIC for the 1989 tax year was $910 (see Table 3), 
therefore, this amount was selected as the appropriate break-
point for developing the number of returns with taxable interest 
income (Int), dividends (Div's), Schedule E rent and royalty in-
come (Sch E), and self-employment earnings from Schedules C 
and F (Sch C/F). Also provided are the frequencies of taxpayers 
with passive activity losses (PALs) and the alternative minimum 
tax (AMT), both of which are typically associated with middle-
to high-income taxpayers. These amounts are summarized sepa-
rately, by AGI class, and illustrate the underlying rationale for 
the EIC wealth restriction-based limitations advanced by O'Neil 
and Nelsestuen (1994) and the ever-increasing tax planning op-
portunities for EIC-maximization, in the absence of such wealth 
restrictions, described by Cataldo (1994). 
Of particular interest are the mean EICs available to high-
income taxpayers in the zero or negative AGI class. Generally, 
these are high-income taxpayers. These taxpayers are receiving 
EICs in average amounts in excess of those available to taxpay-
ers below (above) the $4,000 ($14,000) AGI classes. 
Many of these high-income taxpayers, no doubt engaged in 
non-EIC-related tax planning efforts, are, by chance or design, 
earning additional after-tax, EIC-based returns of between 9% 
and 14% (i.e., $910 divided by the $6,500 through $10,240 flat 
range (1989), respectively) on potentially manipu la ted EI 
amounts. 
Second, part icipat ion rates-based studies indicate tha t 
many (i.e., 14% to 25%) taxpayers, not otherwise required to file 
an income tax return, but qualifying for the EIC, may not be 
aware of the EIC-based benefits foregone through their failure 
to file an income tax return [Scholz, 1994]. Furthermore, "...al-
most none of the recipients obtain the benefits incrementally 
during the course of the year." The result is the " . . . almost total 
ineffectiveness of the advance payment option..." [Yin and 
Forman, 1993, pp. 951 & 953]. 
The failure to achieve very high AEIC participation rates, 
through public awareness of its availability, defers any progress 
(and administrative cost reductions) associated with the elimi-
nation of alternative welfare delivery systems. Though the Inter-
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nal Revenue Service has expanded efforts to publicize the EIC 
program, they tend not to promote the AEIC option to minimize 
noncompliance [Yin and Forman, pp. 954-956].9 
Third, "(s)elf-employed individuals might declare work 
when none had taken place in order to receive a higher value of 
credit" [Steuerle, 1993]. Generally, this argument is consistent 
with the overall trend of increasing EIC credit rate(s) (see Table 
3), and their potential to exceed the combined federal and (net) 
self-employment tax rate. RRA93 aggravates this problem. 
For example, taxpayers, with two dependent children for 
the 1996 tax year, might generate an EIC of 40%, while subject 
to a marginal federal income tax rate of only 15% (or even 0%) 
plus the self-employment tax rate of less than 15.3% (after ad-
justments), for a net "profit" of 10% (i.e., 40% minus approxi-
mately 30%) (see Table 3). 
Fur thermore, separate and apart from self-employment 
earnings over-reporting, " . . . nearly one in three of those receiv-
ing the credit in 1990 was ineligible" [Kirchheimer, 1993]. 
Again, the incentive for false reporting evolves from the fact that 
the EIC benefits or phase-in credit rate frequently exceeds the 
taxpayer's marginal tax rate (see Table 3). Additional overpay-
ments arise from income variability, multiple employers, and 
those cases where both married taxpayers work and elect the 
AEIC option [Holt, 1994, pp. 760-762]. 
Finally, the politically popular "workfare" or work incentive 
feature of the EIC is questionable. Moore [1993, p. 106] reminds 
us that 
(f)or people already working, the EITC will increase 
their overall income level in each and every range. Con-
ventional analysis and a wide range of studies indicate 
the "income effect" alone tends to discourage work, 
since a family can attain any particular level of income 
with less work than in the absence of the EITC pay-
ment. 
(T)he "substitution" effect of the EITC varies with each 
of the ranges. In the phase-in range, it encourages 
9Yin and Forman [1993, p. 954], noting the findings of a U.S. General 
Accounting Office report [GAO/GGD-92-132, 1992], explain that the IRS, in an 
effort to increase full compliance with the EIC, awarded the credit to 600,000 
taxpayers for the 1991 tax year. These taxpayers failed to claim, but appeared to 
qualify for the credit. The IRS subsequently found that 270,000 (45%) of the 
awards were incorrect. 
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work, because the reward for an additional hour of 
work has increased. In the (flat) range, the substitution 
effect does not come into play because the credit re-
mains at the maximum level as income is increased. 
Finally, in the phase-out range, the substitution effect 
provides a disincentive (emphasis added) to work, 
since the worker now finds that the EITC is reduced as 
income increases. Thus, the worker's effective wage has 
been reduced. 
In the (flat) range, only the income effect applies, and 
tends to discourage work. 
The ever-increasing flat range (see Exhibits 2 and 3) results 
only in the "income effect," and work efforts may be discour-
aged once achieved/surpassed. The phase-out range provides for 
a work disincentive. The family is richer as a result of the EIC, 
and additional work is less rewarding [Moore, 1993, p. 106]. 
These effects exacerbate the effective marginal tax rates of EIC 
recipients to a minimum of 34.5% (i.e., the phase-out rate of 
19.5% plus the marginal tax rate 15% for the 1993 tax year). 
SUMMARY 
The EIC phase-in rates have increased from 10%, for the 
1975 through 1978 period, to a planned rate of as much as 40% 
for the 1996 tax year. Like the first EIC, established in the early 
1920s, the post-RRA93 EIC is now available to taxpayers with-
out dependents. Unlike the first EIC, expansion of the post-1974 
EIC has taken the form of a "workfare"-based variation of guar-
anteed income or negative income tax. Increases in coverage 
and phase-in credit percentages have taken place prior to the 
resolution of problems with compliance and delivery, preventing 
the EIC from replacing alternative welfare systems. 
Without a wealth-based restriction, the EIC cannot progress 
to replace traditional welfare systems possessing such features. 
The higher, post-RRA93 EIC benefits and/or phase-in credit 
rates may provide unintended beneficiaries with ever-increasing 
economic incentives for the "positioning" of their earned income 
within broadening flat ranges. Retaining the politically popular 
"work incentive" feature of the EIC, which is incompatible with 
existing welfare systems, is the very vehicle through which such 
manipulation becomes possible. 
Those responsible for the first EIC (1923-1931) were con-
cerned with the infeasibility of successfully separating earned 
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and unearned income components. They anticipated and com-
pletely avoided this latter issue, appearing to have left us with a 
historical lesson unlearned.10 And this politically popular "work 
incentive" feature may not even be supported by empirical evi-
dence when substitution and income effects are considered. 
If these issues remain unresolved, the next logical step in 
the evolution of the EIC may remain the elimination of the 
"work incentive" component. However, while elimination of the 
need for any distinction between earned and unearned income 
would resolve problems associated with EIC-maximizing tax 
planning and provide for the elimination of concurrent transfer 
payment systems, a wealth-based means-test would still be nec-
essary. 
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